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NOTES
A NEW BRIGHT LINE RULE FOR GENERAL CONSTRUC-
TION CONTRACTORS-Brady v. Fulghum, 309 N.C. 580, 308
S.E.2d 327 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
Article 1 of Chapter 87 of the General Statutes of North Caro-
lina, governing general construction contractors,' clearly contem-
plates that a general contractor be licensed at the time the con-
tract to construct is made and during the entire period of
construction.2 Specifically, North Carolina General Statute § 87-10
requires an examination of all applicants seeking to be licensed as
general contractors.' Under G.S. § 87-10, an applicant must not
only pass the examination administered by the State Licensing
Board for General Contractors, but must also certify his good
1. A general contractor is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-1 (Supp. 1983) as
"any person or firm or corporation who for a fixed price, commission, fee or wage,
undertakes to bid upon or to construct or who undertakes to superintend or man-
age . . . the construction of any building, highway, public utilities, grading or any
improvement or structure where the cost of the undertaking is . . . $30,000 or
more, shall be deemed to be a 'general contractor' engaged in the business of gen-
eral contracting in the State of North Carolina." Vogel v. Supply Co., 277 N.C.
119, 177 S.E. 2d 273 (1970) (a sub-contractor is not required to be licensed under
the statute); Duke Univ. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n., 64 N.C. App. 75, 306 S.E.2d
584 (1983) (G.S § 87-1 does not apply to any construction contract for $30,000 or
more, a general contractor is determined by the degree of control over the con-
struction project); Phillips v. Parton, 59 N.C. App. 179, 296 S.E.2d 317 (1982);
Helms v. Dawkins, 32 N.C. App. 453, 232 S.E.2d 710 (1977); Hickory Furniture
Mart v. Burns, 31 N.C. App. 626, 230 S.E.2d 609 (1976).
2. Barrett, Robert and Wood, Inc. v. Armi, 59 N.C. App. 134, 139, 296 S.E.2d
10, 14, disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299 S.E.2d 214 (1982).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-10 (Supp. 1983). "Anyone seeking.to be licensed as a
general contractor in this State shall file an application for an examination ....
The Board shall conduct an examination, either oral or written, of all applicants
for license to ascertain the ability ... and ... qualifications of the applicant...."
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-2 (1981) creates the State Licensing Board for Gen-
eral Contractors that is composed of seven members which include five general
contractors and two public members appointed by the Governor.
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character and qualifications as to competency, ability and integ-
rity.5 Further, G.S. § 87-13 makes non-compliance with the statu-
tory requirements under Article 1, Chapter 87 a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by either fine, imprisonment or both.
Article 1, Chapter 87 of the General Statutes prohibits a gen-
eral contractor from undertaking7 to construct a building, structure
or improvement' costing $30,000 or more.9 The purpose of Article
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-10 requires that "[b]efore being entitled to an exami-
nation an applicant must show to the satisfaction of the Board from the applica-
tion and proofs furnished that the applicant is possessed of good character and is
otherwise qualified as to competency, ability and integrity .. .
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-13 (1981). "Any person, firm or corporation not being
duly authorized who shall contract for or bid upon the construction of any of the
projects or works enumerated in G.S. § 87-1, without having first complied with
the provisions hereof .... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ... [punisha-
ble] by a fine of not less than . . . $500.00 or imprisonment of three months, or
both . . . ." This statute must be strictly construed due to the criminal penalties
imposed. Its scope may not be expanded beyond the meaning of the statutory
language so as to include offenses not clearly described. Walker Grading and
Hauling v. S.R.F. Mgmt. Corp., 311 N.C. 170, 178, 316 S.E.2d 298, 303 (1984).
Duke Univ. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 64 N.C. App. 75, 306 S.E.2d 584 (1983);
Sager v. W.M.C., Inc., 64 N.C. App. 546, 307 S.E.2d 585 (1983).
7. Undertaking is defined as, "[ain engagement by one of the parties to a
contract to the other, as distinguished from the mutual engagement of the parties
to each other." Fulton v. Rice, 12 N.C. App. 669, 672, 184 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1971)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1696 (4th ed. 1968)). "The undertaking is the
promise or engagement." Id. at 672, 184 S.E.2d at 423.
8. "A building is defined as '[a]n edifice . . . a structure;' and a structure is
defined as '[t]hat which is built or constructed; an edifice or building of any kind.'
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244, 1592 (4th ed. 1968);... So when the words building
and structure are strictly construed, in context with the remainder of G.S. § 87-1,
they do not embrace parts or segments of a building or structure." Vogel v. Sup-
ply Co., 277 N.C. at 132, 177 S.E.2d at 281. "The term 'improvement' does not
have a definite and fixed meaning .... As used here it connotes the performance
of construction work and presupposes the prior existence of some structure to be
improved. As used with reference to land, the word improvement presupposes the
prior existence of the land itself." Id. "A general contractor is one who undertakes
to build an entire building." Hickory Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Burns, 31 N.C. App.
at 631, 230 S.E.2d at 612 (1976); See also Duke Univ., 64 N.C. App. at 78, 306
S.E.2d at 586.
9. The cost of the undertaking is the cost of the promise or engagement.
Therefore, the cost of the undertaking is the contract price and not the total cost.
The contract price determines whether the statutory limit has been violated and
thus whether the contractor must be licensed. Fulton v. Rice, 12 N.C. App. at 672,
184 S.E.2d at 423. The statutory language "$30,000 or more" includes a contract
price of $30,000. Revis Sand and Stone, Inc. v. King, 49 N.C. App. 168, 170, 270
S.E.2d 580, 581 (1980).
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1, Chapter 87 is to protect the public from incompetent builders."0
As a result, when an unlicensed general contractor, in disregard of
the statutory requirements, contracts with an owner to erect a
building or improvement costing more than the statutory mini-
mum, the unlicensed contractor may not recover if the owner
breaches the contract."' This prohibition is true even though the
statutes do not specifically forbid such suits."
While the statutes are unambiguous in their language and
clearly mandate examination and licensing, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals in its interpretations of the statutes created an
exception based on the doctrine of substantial compliance. 3 In
Brady v. Fulghum, 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected
the doctrine of substantial compliance and ended its application in
this State. 5 In rejecting the doctrine, the court alluded to past dif-
ficulty in the doctrine's application, which resulted in skewed re-
sults and uncertainity of the rights of parties, all of which have
promoted litigation.'"
This note will analyze the background of cases leading up to
the doctrine's rejection and the effect of those cases, as controlling
precedent, in light of the Brady decision. Further, this note will
examine the court's opinion to demonstrate that while the court
specifically rejected the doctrine it left open the door for recovery
by unlicensed general contractors in specific factual circumstances.
THE CASE
In February 1980, Coite P. Brady, d/b/a Brady Building Com-
pany, entered into negotiations with Edwin and Patricia Fulghum.
These negotiations culminated in a written contract for construc-
10. Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 270, 162 S.E.2d 507,
510-11 (1968). See also Walker Grading and Hauling v. S.R.F. Mgmt. Corp., 311
N.C. at 176-77, 316 S.E.2d at 302.
11. Midyette, 274 N.C. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 510-11.
12. Id. See also 53 C.J.S. LICENSES § 59 (1948); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2D 1429
(1962); 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1510-13 (1962).
13. "Compliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of
a statute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979). A doctrine of judicial
creation which with respect to the licensing of general construction contractors,
allows contractors who have not fully complied with the licensing requirements to
recover on their construction contracts if they demonstrate substantial compli-
ance with the licensing requirements.
14. 309 N.C. 580, 308 S.E.2d 327 (1983).
15. Id. at 583, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
16. Id. at 583, 308 S.E.2d at 330.
19841
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tion of the Fulghum's house. The total contract price was approxi-
mately $106,850. Brady began construction some time around
March 13, 1980.11 Neither during negotiation of the contract, at the
time the contract was signed nor when Brady began construction
of the Fulghum's home, was he licensed as a general contractor as
required by North Carolina law. 8 Brady was awarded his builders
license on October 22, 1980, after passing the exam. At that time,
Brady had completed two-thirds of the work on the Fulghum's
home. The Fulghums paid Brady the sum of $104,000 and refused
to pay any more.19
Brady sued the Fulghums for $2,850, the amount due under
the original contract, and an additional $28,926.41 for "additions
and changes" that the Fulghums requested during construction.2"
In their answer, the defendants alleged that Brady could not re-
cover further under the contract because he was not a licensed
contractor within the meaning of G.S. § 87-1.21 The trial court en-
tered summary judgment for the defendants and Brady appealed.2
The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge properly
granted summary judgment for the defendants based upon Brady's
non-compliance with Article 1, Chapter 87.23 In holding that sum-
mary judgment was properly entered for the defendants, the court
of appeals concluded that Brady was not entitled to the benefit of
the doctrine of substantial compliance. 2' Brady argued that he had
substantially complied with the statutory licensing requirements
when he obtained his license during the course of construction.25
The court held that Brady had not substantially complied with the
licensing requirements because he was not licensed during the ma-
jority of the construction project.2 Therefore, Brady was not enti-
17. Id. at 581, 308 S.E.2d at 329.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-1 to -14.
19. 309 N.C. at 581, 308 S.E.2d at 329.
20. Id.
21. Brady v. Fulghum, 62 N.C. App. 99, 101, 302 S.E.2d 4, 5 (1983).
22. 309 N.C. at 581, 308 S.E.2d at 329.
23. 62 N.C. App. at 100, 302 S.E.2d at 5.
24. Id. at 102, 302 S.E.2d at 6.
25. Id. Defendant relied on an earlier court of appeals case, Holland v.
Walden, 11 N.C. App. 281, 181 S.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 349, 182 S.E.2d
581 (1971). The court of appeals found defendant's reliance on Holland to be
misplaced because in Holland the contractor was licensed for 88 percent of con-
struction time. In the present case, Brady did not obtain his license until two-
thirds of construction was completed.
26. Id.
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tled to recover on the basic contract or for any additional expendi-
tures or "extras.
27
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the result
reached by the court of appeals but rejected the basis for the
court's decision-the doctrine of substantial compliance.28 The
court held that Brady had illegally entered into the contract to
construct the Fulghum's home. 29 Furthermore, his subsequent pro-
curement of a license did not make legal a contract that was illegal
in its inception." For these reasons, the contract was held to be
unenforceable by Brady.
BACKGROUND
The question of whether an unlicensed general contractor may
enforce or recover on his contract is determined primarily by stat-
ute. It is well settled that statutes that expressly provide that a
contract of an unlicensed person cannot be enforced unless that
person establishes that he was duly licensed, will not allow an unli-
censed person to enforce his contract or recover for services ren-
dered thereunder. 1 Where the licensing statutes make no express
provision relating to the validity or enforceability of such con-
tracts, the courts have looked to the purpose and intent of the
statutes for guidance. A determinative factor is whether the stat-
utes were enacted as a police power measure for the protection of
the public health or welfare against fraud and incompetence, or
merely as a revenue measure.2 If the statutes are an exercise of
police power, it is much more likely that in addition to the express
statutory penalties, the non-conforming party will be penalized by
the courts by denying him the enforcement of his bargain.3 Most
state licensing statutes which govern general contractors do not ex-
pressly provide for such forfeitures. Instead, they fix penalties of
minor character and vest the courts with discretion in applying the
penalties. 4 Therefore, in most states, the added penalty of non-
27. Id.
28. 309 N.C. at 581, 308 S.E.2d at 328-29.
29. Id. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
30. Id.
31. Annot., 82 A.L.R.2D 1429 (1962). See also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and
Permits § 69 (1970).
32. Id.
33. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1512 (1962).
34. Id. See supra note 6, for N.C. Statute fixing penalities for non-
compliance.
1984]
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enforceability of a bargain is a judicial creation. 5
Article 1, Chapter 87 of the General Statutes does not ex-
pressly forbid suits by unlicensed general contractors on their con-
tracts to construct.36 The statutes in North Carolina were enacted
as a police power measure.37 In Bryan Builders Supply v. Midy-
ette, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared the purpose of
Article 1, Chapter 87 to be for the protection of the public from
incompetent builders.38 Midyette involved an action by a contrac-
tor against the owners for a balance allegedly due under a contract
to construct the owners' home. The owners counter-claimed for
damages and alleged that the contractor was not a licensed con-
tractor as required by Article 1, Chapter 87. The contractor admit-
ted that at the time he entered into the contract he was not li-
censed. The trial court entered judgment for the owners and the
builder appealed. 39 The supreme court found no error in the trial
below but determined that the contract of an unlicensed contractor
should not be held void.40 Such contracts are not without legal sig-
nificance because they are enforceable by the property owner in an
action for damages for breach of contract.41
Denial of recovery to an unlicensed contractor rests upon his
conduct that violates the licensing statutes and not the nature of
the transaction.42 However, the property owner's conduct is not vi-
olative of the statutes. Furthermore, the property owner is among
the class of persons protected by the statutes, and denying relief to
the owner would defeat the licensing statutes' purpose thereby pe-
nalizing the person intended to have the statutes' protection."3
The court in Midyette also denied recovery based on theories
of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment."" Again the court's rea-
soning was based on the legislative purpose of protection of the
public from incompetent builders. "To deny an unlicensed contrac-
35. Id.
36. 274 N.C. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 511.
37. Ar-Con Construction Co. v. Anderson, 5 N.C. App. 12, 19, 168 S.E.2d 18,
23 (1969); 309 N.C. at 584-85, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
38. 274 N.C. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 510-11.
39. Id. at 269, 162 S.E.2d at 510.
40. Id. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 511. "A void contract is no contract at all; it
binds no one and is a mere nullity."
41. Id.
42. Id. at 271, 162 S.E.2d at 511.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 273, 162 S.E.2d at 512.
204 [Vol. 7:199
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tor the right to recover damages for breach of contract, which it
was unlawful for him to make, but to allow him to recover the
value of work and services furnished under that contract would de-
1141feat the legislative purpose....
Following Midyette, in Ar-Con Construction Company v. An-
derson," the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied recovery to a
corporate contractor suing for money owed for materials and labor
furnished in the construction of defendant's home. The contractor
did not hold a general contractor's license at the time of contract
nor at any time during the construction period. The evidence
showed that he did hold a license approximately one year prior to
the time of the contract with the defendants, but the license had
expired and had not been renewed.4 7 The plaintiff contended that
it substantially complied with the statutory requirements because
at one time it held a valid license as required in G.S. § 87-10.48
The plaintiff relied on Latipac Inc. v. Superior Court of Ma-
rin County49 a California case that allowed the contractor to main-
tain its suit to recover the balance due on a contract with the
owner. However, the court of appeals distinguished Latipac in one
very important respect. The contractor in Latipac was licensed at
the time of the contract and his license remained in full effect fif-
teen months thereafter. 50 Because Ar-Con did not have a valid li-
cense at the time of contract, it had not substantially complied
with the licensing statutes. 1
The plaintiff's second argument in support of substantial com-
pliance revolved around the requirement under G.S. § 87-10 that a
45. Id. at 273, 162 S.E.2d at 513 . In dicta the court recognized a qualifica-
tion of rule noted in Culbertson v. Cizek, 225 Cal. App. 2d 451, 37 Cal. Rptr. 548
(1964). That case held that an unlicensed person could offset, as a defense against
damages due the owner, any sums which the owner owed to him. The supreme
court in Midyette noted that this relaxation in the rule would allow the unli-
censed contractor to assert his counter-demands defensively in an effort to reduce
in whole or in part the claims against him for damages. 274 N.C. at 273, 162
S.E.2d at 513. "[A] general contractor can enforce his contract defensively, as a
set-off to the claims asserted against him, though the set-off cannot exceed his
adversary's claims." Hickory Furniture Mart, Inc., 31 N.C. App. at 633, 230
S.E.2d at 613.
46. 5 N.C. App. 12, 168 S.E.2d 18 (1969).
47. Id. at 15, 168 S.E.2d at 20.
48. Id. at 17, 168 S.E.2d at 21.
49. 64 Cal. 2d 278, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676, 411 P.2d 564 (1966).
50. 5 N.C. App. at 18, 168 S.E.2d at 22.
51. Id. at 19, 168 S.E.2d at 22.
1984] 205
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renewal fee be paid every year. The plaintiff argued that the statu-
torily required renewal fee was merely for revenue purposes.
Therefore, even though it had neglected to pay the renewal fee, it
should still be considered as having substantially complied with
the statutes.2 The court of appeals quickly rejected that argument,
finding a clear legislative intent that the annual renewal fees were
an important requirement in order to accomplish the protective
public purpose of the statutes.5
Finally, the plaintiff alleged waiver, claiming that the defen-
dants had knowledge at the time of contract that the contractor
was not licensed. The court of appeals countered this argument,
holding that nothing in the statute allows a third party to waive
the statutory requirements. Further, the statutes do not grant im-
munity to a contractor just because he Jadvises his customers of his
unlicensed status.5 4
Holland v. Walden55 was another action by a contractor
against the owner to recover a balance due on the construction
contract. The court of appeals found the contractor to be a general
contractor within the definition of G.S. § 87-1"6 and subject to the
licensing requirements of G.S. § 87-10.57 Therefore, "[u]nless [the
contractor] substantially complied with those [statutory] provi-
sions, [the contractor] may not recover against the defendants
whether on [the] contract or upon quantum meruit.' '5 8 Based on
the factual situation presented in this case, the court of appeals
held that the contractor had substantially complied with the li-
censing requirements and therefore was able to maintain an action
on the contract.59 The court distinguished both Midyette and Ar-
Con Construction because in those cases the contractors were
neither licensed at the time of contract nor at any time during the
subsequent construction period."
The court of appeals in Holland v. Walden found substantial
compliance even though the contractor was not licensed at the
52. Id. at 19, 168 S.E.2d at 22-23.
53. Id. at 19-20, 168 S.E.2d at 23.
54. Id. at 20, 168 S.E.2d at 23.
55. 11 N.C. App. 281, 181 S.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 349, 182 S.E.2d
581 (1971).
56. See supra note 1.
57. See supra notes 3 and 5. 11 N.C. App. at 284, 181 S.E.2d at 199.
58. 11 N.C. App. at 284, 181 S.E.2d at 199.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 284-85, 181 S.E.2d at 200.
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time of contract or when she commenced construction of the build-
ing. Dispositive on the issue of substantial compliance was that for
88 percent of the construction time the contractor held a valid li-
cense."' Further, the court found that allowing the contractor to
maintain her action upon the contract did not conflict with the
purpose of the licensing statutes. Quite the contrary. The court
held that it would defeat the purpose of the statutes if under these
circumstances a contractor was denied a right of action.2
Barrett, Robert and Woods, Inc. v. Armi,"3 was the last case
decided by the court of appeals which interpreted the doctrine of
substantial compliance prior to the Brady decision. In this case a
general contractor filed suit alleging breach of contract and failure
of the owner to pay. The defendant owners filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was not licensed as
a general contractor during a majority of the construction period."
The motion for summary judgment was denied. Following a non-
jury trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and the defen-
dants appealed."
The issue presented to the court of appeals was: What consti-
tutes "substantial compliance" under the licensing statutes so that
a contractor may maintain an action on the contract? 6 In answer-
ing the question, the court rejected the contractor's argument that
possession of a valid license at time of contract is sufficient.6 The
time of contract is of great significance since that is the time the
owner must decide whether the contractor is competent. However,
it is not enough to rise to the level of substantial compliance. 8
In justifying the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance, the court concluded that the protective policy of the
statutes was realized when a contractor had substantially complied
with the licensing requirements.6 9 That conclusion was reached by
the court's reliance on the following facts. The plaintiff was duly
61. Id. at 285, 181 S.E.2d at 200.
62. Id.
63. 59 N.C. App. 134, 296 S.E.2d 10, cert. denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299 S.E.2d
214 (1982).
64. 59 N.C. App. at 135-36, 296 S.E.2d at 12.
65. Id. at 136, 296 S.E.2d at 12.
66. Id. at 139, 296 S.E.2d at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 140, 296 S.E.2d at 14. See also Holland v. Walden, cited supra
note 55.
1984]
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licensed as a general contractor at the time of the contract. The
plaintiff's license lapsed because of inadvertence, not incompetence
or disciplinary action. The plaintiff's license was renewed immedi-
ately. The plaintiff's financial condition and composition remained
unchanged during the period it was not licensed. 70 Although the
plaintiff was not licensed for 90 percent of the construction period,
the above factors were sufficient to persuade the court that the
protective purpose of the licensing statutes was satisfied. There-
fore, the plaintiff was not be barred from recovery under its
contract.
71
ANALYSIS
The court of appeals analyzed Brady v. Fulghum in terms of
whether the contractor had substantially complied with the licens-
ing requirements.72 A majority of the panel concluded that because
the contractor was not licensed during 66 percent of the construc-
tion period and because the contractor was not licensed at the time
of contract, he had not substantially complied with the licensing
requirements. 73
The supreme court rejected the doctrine of substantial compli-
ance, reiterated the purpose of the licensing statutes as previously
stated in Midyette74 and expounded upon it.75 The express lan-
guage of G.S. § 87-10 clearly indicates that it is intended to insure
competence within the construction industry.76 The court inter-
preted the examination requirement as an attempt to fulfill the
legislative goal guaranteeing "skill, training and ability to accom-
plish such construction in a safe and workmanlike fashion. ' '77 "In
tandem, these requirements 'protect members of the general public
without regard to the impact upon individual contractors.' "78
The court also restated the general rules with respect to en-
forceabiltiy of contracts entered into by unlicensed general con-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Brady v. Fulghum, 309 N.C. at 583, 308 S.E.2d at 330.
73. 62 N.C. App. 99, 102, 302 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1983) (Vaughn, C.J., dissenting).
74. 274 N.C. 264, 162 S.E.2d 507.
75. 309 N.C. at 582, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
76. Id. at 584, 308 S.E.2d at 330.
77. Id. (quoting Arnold Constr. Co. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 109 Ariz. 495,
498, 512 P.2d 1229, 1232 (1973)).
78. 309 N.C. at 584, 308 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting Urbatec v. Yuma County,
614 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis supplied).
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struction contractors. 79 These types of contracts are unenforceable
by the contractor because they are entered into in violation of pub-
lic protection statutes.8 0 The unenforceability of such contracts
stems directly from their beginning in the contractor's illegal act.8 1
It is not the nature of the transaction, but rather the conduct of
the contractor which renders these contracts unenforceable by the
unlicensed general contractor.2
The argument in favor of abolishment of the doctrine of sub-
stantial compliance is clearly one of public policy. Denial of recov-
ery and unenforceability to unlicensed general contractors is sup-
ported by several worthy considerations, all of which were relied on
by the supreme court in Brady. The Legislature, by enacting such
statutes, exercised its police power. It is a power invoked to protect
the public from fraud, incompetence and irresponsibility. Denying
recovery and making these contracts unenforceable by the unli-
censed contractor has the effect of encouraging obedience to the
statutes, thereby providing the public with optimum protection.83
Had the supreme court's opinion stopped here, the doctrine of
substantial compliance with respect to general contractors, as de-
fined in G.S. § 87-1, would have truly been abolished in this state.
However, while rejecting the doctrine and acknowledging the harsh
consequences that might result, the court also recognized a minor-
ity rule.84 From the case of Ar-Con Construction Company v. An-
derson,85 the case of Latipac Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin
County86 and its progency still survive in North Carolina. The
North Carolina Supreme Court in Brady agreed with the Califor-
nia court in Latipac, that the existence of a license at the time the
contract is signed is determinative:
The key moment of time when the existence of the license be-
comes determinative is the time when the other party to the
agreement must decide whether the contractor possesses the req-
79. 309 N.C. at 583, 308 S.E.2d at 330.
80. Id. See also F.N. Thompson, Inc. v. Anchor Invest. Co., 239 F.2d 470
(4th Cir. 1956); Olsen v. Reece, 114 Utah 411, 416, 200 P.2d 733, 736 (1948).
81. 309 N.C. at 584, 308 S.E.2d at 330.
82. Midyette, 274 N.C. at 271, 162 S.E.2d at 511.
83. 309 N.C. at 584-85, 308 S.E.2d at 331. See also 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1512 (1962); Enlow and Son, Inc. v. Higerson, 201 Va. 780, 787, 113
S.E.2d 855, 860 (1960).
84. 309 N.C. at 585, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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uisite responsibility and competence and whether he should, in
the first instance, enter into the relationship .... We agree that
the existence of a license at the time the contract is signed is de-
terminative and attach "great weight to the significant moment of
the entrance of the parties into the relationship. 8 7
The result of the court's opinion is two basic rules. First, a
contract "illegally entered into by an unlicensed general construc-
tion contractor is unenforceable by the contractor."8 8 Subsequent
procurement of a license will not validate the contract.8 9 This
means that when an unlicensed general construction contractor
enters into a contract of construction there can be no substantial
compliance with the licensing statutes.90 The non-existence of a li-
cense at the time the contract is signed is determinative. In this
circumstance, the doctrine of substantial compliance with respect
to general construction contractors has been abolished in this
state. The contract of an unlicensed construction contractor is not,
however void. 1 The individuals for whom the protective statutes
were passed do not act illegally by becoming parties to such a con-
87. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
88. Id. (emphasis supplied).
89. Id. This is in line with the general rule that "[wihere the bargain is
illegal and a change of facts removes the cause of the illegality the contract does
not thereby become enforceable except... where either party did not know or
have reason to know of the illegality. However, where a change in fact occurs
which removes the cause of the illegality the parties may subsequently ratify the
agreement." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-14 (2d ed.
1977). 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1532 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 609 (1932).
90. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
91. Id. However the general rule is that an illegal bargain is void. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONrRACTS §§ 598, 607 (1932). A bargain (contract) is illegal if either its
formation or performance is criminal, tortious or otherwise opposed to public pol-
icy. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932). To form a valid bilateral contract
there must be consideration on both sides. If A promises to do something illegal
and B promises to do something legal, there can be no action for breach on either
side. There is no mutuality of obligation. A may not sue because his illegal prom-
ise does not constitute consideration for B's promise and B may not sue, even
though he promises to do something lawful. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 607
comment a (1977); cf. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1523 (1962). Despite
the general rule, there are cases where a party may sue upon an illegal executory
bilateral contract. One exception is where a particular statute is directed against
one of the parties and designed to protect the other party. This exception would
include the public protective licensing statutes. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CON-
TRACTS § 1540 (1962); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-14
(2d ed. 1977).
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tract.9 2 These parties may enforce the contract against the unli-
censed contractor.93
Second, "if a licensed contractor's license expires, for whatever
reason, during construction, he may recover for only the work per-
formed while he was duly licensed." '94 This second rule incorpo-
rates, by implication, the first rule. The contractor must of course
be licensed at the time the contract was signed. This second rule
applies when the license expires during construction. If the con-
tractor renews his license during construction, he may only recover
for work performed while he was licensed, or in other words, before
expiration and after renewal.95
What is the effect of Brady on the cases leading up to this
decision? Clearly, Midyette remains good law following the Brady
decision. Midyette was not decided on the basis of the doctrine of
substantial compliance. It set the standard for evaluating the pur-
pose of the licensing statutes and the legislative intent behind
them.9 The court in Midyette held that the contracts of unli-
censed general construction contractors should not be termed
"void." These contracts have legal effect because the innocent
party may maintain an action for damages for breach of the
contract.9"
Recovery on the basis of quantum meruit was denied by the
supreme court in Midyette.93 Under Brady, the result is the same.
If a contractor is unlicensed at the time the contract is signed, he
may not recover on the contract or for the value of the work and
services furnished under the contract.99 The contract is illegal as to
the contractor and he may not recover on any theory. However, if
the contractor is licensed at the time of contract and his license
subsequently expires, he may recover for the work performed while
licensed.100 His recovery is based on the contract, legally entered
into, for the time period it remained legal.
Ar-Con Construction Company v. Anderson'0 1 was decided by
92. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331-32.
93. Id at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
94. Id. (emphasis supplied).
95. Id.
96. 274 N.C. at 270-71, 162 S.E.2d at 510-11.
97. Id. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 511.
98. Id. at 273, 162 S.E.2d at 512
99. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
100. Id. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
101. 5 N.C. App. 12, 168 S.E.2d 18 (1969).
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the court of appeals on the basis of the doctrine of substantial
compliance. The contractor was found to have failed to substan-
tially comply with the licensing requirements.0 2 However, Ar-Con
is still significant for its reliance on Latipac, a case relied on by the
supreme court in Brady. The court of appeals in Ar-Con relied on
Latipac's primary requirement of a license at the time the contract
is signed to hold that because the contractor did not have a license
at the time the contract was signed he had not substantially com-
plied with the licensing requirements. 103 The same result would be
reached under Brady but for a different reason. Under Brady the
contractor would be denied recovery because when an unlicensed
general construction contractor enters into a construction contract
there can be no substantial compliance with the licensing statutes.
Ar-Con provides an example of a circumstance in which the doc-
trine of substantial compliance has truly been abolished. Further,
Ar-Con provides sound discussion of the purpose of Article 1,
Chapter 87 as a police power measure and not a revenue
measure. 104
If the facts as presented in Holland v. Walden'0 5 were decided
under the new Brady rules, the contractor would not be allowed
recovery under any theory. It should be remembered that in Hol-
land the contractor was not licensed at the time the contract was
signed. 0 6 The court of appeals, however, found substantial compli-
ance from the fact that the contractor was licensed during 88 per-
cent of the construction period. 107 Under the Brady rules, the con-
tractor would be denied recovery. Her contract would be illegal
and unforceable by her.'08 Accordingly, it could not be validated by
her subsequent procurement of a license.10 9 For all intents and
purposes, Holland v. Walden has no precedential value in light of
Brady and by implication has been overruled.
In Barrett, Robert and Woods, Inc. v. Armi," 0 the court of
102. Id. at 19, 168 S.E.2d at 22, 23.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 19-20, 168 S.E.2d at 22-23.
105. 11 N.C. App. 281, 181 S.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 349, 182 S.E.2d
581 (1971).
106. Id. at 282, 181 S.E.2d at 198.
107. Id. at 285, 181 S.E.2d at 200.
108. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331.
109. Id.
110. 59 N.C. App. 134, 296 S.E.2d 10, disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299
S.E.2d 214 (1982).
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appeals also held that the contractor should not be barred from
recovery on the contract.111 In Armi, the contractor was licensed at
the time the contract was signed. Through inadvertence his license
lapsed but was not renewed until after the work required under
the contract had been completed. Furthermore, his financial condi-
tion and composition remained unchanged during construction.1 1 2
These factors were important to the court of appeals in determin-
ing that substantial compliance existed, even in light of the fact
that the contractor was not licensed for 90 percent of the construc-
tion period. "' Under the Brady rules only one of the four factors
considered by the court of appeals would have any significance.
That factor being that the contractor was licensed at the time the
contract was signed." 4 Under Brady this requirement must be met
in order for there to be any recovery on the contract." 5
The contractor in Armi would be subject to the second rule of
Brady. Because the contractor maintained a valid license at the
time of contract, he would be allowed to maintain his action based
on the contract. However, he would only be able to recover the
work performed while he was duly licensed."' Under the second
rule of Brady the contractor in Armi would be limited to a ten
percent recovery." 7
111. Id. at 140, 296 S.E.2d at 14.
112. Id. It is significant to note that the expiration of the license was inad-
vertent and as soon as the error was discovered the contractor moved to renew his
license.
113. Id.
114. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331. As stated in Brady the reason for
lapse or expiration is of no consequence. The court never mentions other factors
such as financial condition or composition. Although, these have been held to be
significant in that they go toward the purposes of the statutes, to protect from
fraud and incompetence. Renewal of course is important but only to the extent
that renewal occurs during construction period. Renewal after construction is
completed will not aid the contractor in his quest for recovery. Id. at 586, 308
S.E.2d at 332.
115. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.,E.2d at 332.
116. Id.
117. 59 N.C. App. at 140, 296 S.E.2d at 14. This is of course must be quali-
fied. The facts in Armi indicate that the defendant owners had paid nothing on
the contract. The suit was to recover all amounts due on the contract. Of course
the amount of recovery excluding all other claims and defenses, would not neces-
sarily be ten percent recovery. Under Brady the contractor could only recover for
work performed while he was licensed. As determined by the court of appeals he
was licensed only during ten percent of the construction period. Presumably, he
would be allowed to recover the value of the services rendered and materials fur-
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Both Armi and Holland v. Walden illustrate excellent exam-
ples of the potential for harsh results that can occur with non-com-
pliance under the Brady rules. However, the supreme court in
Brady appears to have washed its hands of the matter stating,
"[i]f, by virtue of these rules, harsh results fall upon unlicensed
contractors who violate our statutes, the contractors themselves
bear both the responsibility and the blame.""' 8
How will the Brady rules be applied by the courts in future
disputes between general contractors and property owners? This
question is answered in part by the supreme court's decision in
Sample v. Morgan."19 In Sample a licensed general contractor sued
to recover the balance due on a contract to construct a residential
dwelling for the defendants. At all relevant times the general con-
tractor was duly licensed. However, his license was limited to
$125,000 on any single construction project. The original estimated
cost of the project was approximately $116,000. The total cost of
the dwelling was approximately $140,000. The defendants had paid
the sum of $120,331.82 and had refused to pay any more.'20
The supreme court held that to allow a general contractor to
recover amounts in excess of the statutory limit of his license
would invalidate the legislative purpose of Article 1, Chapter
87-to protect the public from incompetent builders.' 2 ' However,
the court rejected the defendants' argument that based upon the
Brady decision the contractor's claim is barred by Article 1, Chap-
ter 87. As the court in Sample explained, its decision in Brady
adopted a "bright line" rule that requires strict compliance with
the licensing provisions of Article 1, Chapter 87.22 Brady's appli-
cation is limited to the issue of "unlicensed contractors who enter
into construction contracts for which a license is required."'2 3 Un-
til the contractor in Sample exceeded the allowable limit of his
license ($125,000), he was not acting in violation of G.S. § 87-10.
However, once he exceeded the statutory limit he violated the pro-
nished during the time period (ten percent) that he was licensed. This is not re-
covery based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment but actual recovery on the
contract-for during the ten percent time period the contract was legal, valid and
enforceable by the contractor.
118. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
119. 311 N.C. 717, 319 S.E.2d 607 (1984).
120. Id. at 719, 319 S.E.2d at 608-09.
121. Id. at 722, 319 S.E.2d at 611.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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visions of G.S. 87-10.124
Sample v. Morgan is consistent with the Brady rules. Sample
maintained a valid license at the time of contract and during the
construction period. As to the statutory limit of his license, his
contract is enforceable by him. As to the excess amount the con-
tractor will be denied recovery on the contract or on any theory of
unjust enrichment. The contractor may maintain an action for the
amount of work or materials furnished up to the limit of his li-
cense, but no more.' 25
As Brady makes clear, a contract entered into by an unli-
censed general contractor is unenforceable by him against the
property owners.1 26 The contract is not however void or useless.
The purpose of Article 1, Chapter 87 is to protect the public from
incompetent builders.'2 7 "The licensing statutes have no applica-
tion to the rights and liabilities of contractors and sub-contractors
inter se where the public is not involved.' 2 8 Sub-contractors are
not required to be licensed under Article 1, Chapter 87 and they
are not among the class of persons the Legislature intended to pro-
tect by the enactment of G.S. §§ 87-1 to -14.129
Additionally, the unlicensed general contractor may utilize his
otherwise unenforceable contract defensively, as set-off to any
claims asserted against him by the owners in a suit for damages. 130
However, the court of appeals has held that the amount of set-off
cannot exceed the amount of the claims against the contractor.'3 '
CONCLUSION
Public welfare licensing statutes, like G.S. §§ 87-1 to -14 are
for protection against fraud and incompetence. In many situations
however, problems arise when the statute breaker is neither fraud-
ulent or incompetent. In these problem areas, solutions have been
created by the courts. In the past the solution to the problem of
unlicensed general contractors has been the doctrine of substantial
compliance.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 722-23, 319 S.E.2d at 611.
126. 309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 332.
127. 274 N.C. at 270, 162 S.E.2d at 510-11.
128. Vogel, 279 N.C. at 133, 177 S.E.2d at 282.
129. Id.
130. Midyette, 274 N.C. at 273, 162 S.E.2d at 513.
131. Hickory Furniture Mart, Inc., 31 N.C. App. at 633, 230 S.E.2d at 613.
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In situations where a qualified and competent contractor per-
formed excellent services and quality workmanship, the non-com-
pliance appears harmless and denial of recovery does not appear to
further the licensing statutes' purpose or intent. The real de-
frauder appears to be the owner who is attempting to enrich him-
self at the contractor's expense. In these situations the courts have
relied on the doctrine to avoid application of the licensing require-
ments strict mandates in an effort to prevent disproportionate
hardship that would flow from their application. Now that solution
is no longer available. Under the new Brady rules, certain require-
ments must be met. If they are, recovery is allowed; if not it is
denied.
The doctrine of substantial compliance with respect to the
statutory licensing requirements of general construction contrac-
tors was clearly a doctrine of judicial creation. As such, it can be
judicially denied or rejected all together. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court's rejection stems from an unambiguous public protec-
tive statute, founded on a legislative intent to protect the public
from incompetence by attempting to guarantee skill, training and
responsibility. In mandating these mechanically applicable rules,132
the court has attempted to reduce the confusion of the doctrine's
application in the past. However, Brady creates potential for harsh
result that may cause disproportionate hardship. Strict compliance
with the statutory licensing requirements accords with sound pol-
icy except when it operates with disproportionate severity. In cases
that would result in disproportionate severity by strictly applying
the licensing requirements, the courts should be permitted to con-
sider the merits of the particular case and to avoid unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures. Under the Brady rules the courts will be
unable to do so.
Kimberly Ann Kelly
132. Accordingly, we adopt the rule that a contract illegally entered into
by an unlicensed general construction contractor is unenforceable by the
contractor. It cannot be validated by the contractor's subsequent pro-
curement of a license .... Further, if a licensed contractor's license ex-
pires, for whatever reason, during construction, he may recover for only
the work performed while he was duly licensed.
309 N.C. at 586, 308 S.E.2d at 331-32.
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